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MIND THE GAP:  
DEALING WITH RESOURCE  
REVENUE IN THREE PROVINCES
Ron Kneebone†
SUMMARY
Alberta, Saskatchewan, Newfoundland and Labrador have each enjoyed a “rags to riches” story. Each of these 
provinces entered Confederation as poor cousins relative to the rest of the country; Alberta and Saskatchewan 
in 1905 and Newfoundland and Labrador in 1949. Rather remarkably, almost exactly four decades after entering 
Confederation each province began to enjoy the strong economic growth resulting from the development of 
their natural resources; Alberta and Saskatchewan in the late 1940s with the discovery of large pools of oil and 
Newfoundland and Labrador in the early 1990s with the development of off-shore oil. The governments of these 
provinces have similarly enjoyed the benefits of large amounts of revenue realized from the sale of these natural 
resources. In 2013-14, resource revenues accounted for 21 per cent, 22 per cent and 32 per cent of provincial 
revenues in Alberta, Saskatchewan, Newfoundland and Labrador, respectively.
Unfortunately, the benefit of receiving large amounts of resource revenue must be weighed against two costs. 
The first is that these revenues, having flowed into provincial coffers without the need to impose high tax rates on 
citizens, are easily spent. The second cost is that the prices of resources are determined in international markets 
and so a significant amount of the revenues of these provinces is largely unpredictable and often volatile. All three 
provinces have fallen prey to the temptation to allow a large fiscal gap to open between the costs of providing 
health care, education, social assistance and other areas of provincial responsibility and the taxes imposed on 
citizens to pay for these services. Doing so has put all three provinces at financial risk should resource prices fall.
Using a newly constructed data set spanning the period 1970 to 2014, I review the history of how Alberta and 
Saskatchewan have dealt with commodity price shocks and what this has meant for provincial finances. With that 
history as background, I review the response of the government of Newfoundland and Labrador to the flood of 
revenue it has received over the past decade as a result of the development of off-shore oil fields. The evidence 
is clear that Newfoundland and Labrador has adopted the same high-risk budgeting strategy as Alberta and 
Saskatchewan; a strategy that has seen the province choose to fund health care, education and social assistance 
using revenues that are unreliable and unpredictable. As Newfoundland and Labrador prepares for the release 
of its budget for 2015-16, it must begin to deal with the effect on its revenues of a dramatic fall in oil prices, a 
historically large budget deficit and a threat to the financial viability of its health, education and social assistance 
programs.
† 
I owe thanks to Margarita Wilkins and to Gina Sea for their patient and careful attention to detail while combing through 
provincial public accounts. Thanks are also owed to an anonymous referee for helpful comments.
11. INTRODUCTION
Three Canadian provinces have enjoyed a “rags to riches” story thanks to having access to generous 
amounts of natural resources; resources that have, in recent history, generated large amounts of 
revenues for the governments of those provinces.
The province of Alberta entered Confederation in 1905 and although deposits of small pools of 
oil were known at that time, it was not until 1947 that very large amounts of oil were discovered. 
Prior to then, Alberta was a poor province reliant upon agriculture. It was hard-hit by the Great 
Depression and declared bankruptcy in 1935. Once the extent of Alberta’s oil wealth became 
apparent, however, a well-developed royalty regime ensured that its public finances would benefit 
from an enormous inflow of oil revenue. The OPEC oil price shocks of the 1970s, a constitutional 
battle with the federal government in the early 1980s and frequent dramatic rises and falls in oil 
prices since then, have all contributed to the government of Alberta having to continually deal with 
uncertainty in its largest source of revenue. In 2013-14, the province relied on the income earned 
from the exploitation of its natural resources to fund 22 per cent of its program expenditures.
Entering Confederation at the same time as Alberta, the province of Saskatchewan was, like 
Alberta, mainly agricultural. The Great Depression devastated the agriculturally-based economy 
but, like Alberta, the province soon after enjoyed the benefits of the discovery of significant pools 
of oil in the early 1950s. Potash was also discovered in the 1950s as a by-product of oil and gas 
exploration and today Saskatchewan is the 2nd largest producer of the mineral in the world. In 2013-
14, the province relied on the income earned from the exploitation of its natural resources to fund 22 
per cent of its program expenditures.
A very similar story, though one shifted ahead by four decades, can be told of Newfoundland & 
Labrador. The province entered Confederation in 1949 as a very poor province. For the next four 
decades it remained poor and heavily reliant on transfers from the federal government. Its finances 
were weak and by the 1980s the cost of servicing government debt threatened it with bankruptcy. 
The discovery and development of off-shore oil beginning in the 1990s had a dramatic effect on 
the economy and the finances of the provincial government. In 2013-14, the province relied on the 
income earned from the exploitation of its natural resources to fund over 32 per cent of its program 
expenditures.
Having access to the revenues generated by the exploitation of fossil fuels and other natural 
resources carries with it both positive and negative consequences for provincial government budgets. 
On the one hand, royalties, land sales and fees provide governments with sometimes very large 
revenues that can be used to finance the provision of health care, education and other vital public 
services without the need for usurious tax rates on personal or corporate incomes. On the other 
hand, these revenues are often volatile and unpredictable making it a risky budgeting strategy to rely 
on them to fund critical programs in health, education and social welfare.
This note examines 44 years of data (1970-71 to 2013-14) drawn from the public accounts of the 
provinces of Alberta, Saskatchewan, Newfoundland and Labrador.1 During this period price shocks 
resulting from the efforts of the Oil Producing Exporting Countries (OPEC) to influence world 
oil prices, the federal government’s National Energy Program, increases in world demand for oil 
resulting from the transformation of the economy of China and the recent fall in prices as a result 
of the glut in supply stemming from the development of oil shale have all had dramatic effects on 
1 A description of the data is found in the appendix to this paper.
2the revenues these provinces realize from the production of oil and gas. Shocks to potash prices and 
disagreements between the industry and the government have also played a role in creating volatility 
in the resource revenues collected by the government of Saskatchewan. Unique to Newfoundland 
and Labrador is that only late in our sample period did the province begin to collect substantial 
amounts of resource revenues; this stemming from the development of off-shore oil fields beginning 
in the 1990s.
Using these long time series, I compare the histories of how resource revenues have impacted the 
budgets of these three provinces and highlight how unfortunate budgetary responses are common 
across provinces which have been repeated over time.
The next section presents a simple accounting framework for understanding and appreciating 
the implications of how provincial governments respond to rises and falls in resource revenues. 
This framework is then put to work by using it to understand the finances of the three provincial 
governments over the past 44 years. The paper closes with a discussion of the implications of 
resource revenues for effective budgeting.
2. THE GAP
The following equation defines a budget constraint for a government’s operating account balance:
1 1t t t t t t t tD D G rD T TR NRR        
Gt = provincial government program spending; spending on goods and services and transfers to 
individuals and firms in period t
Tt = provincial government revenues from taxation on all sources but natural resources in period t
TRt = federal government transfers received by the provincial government
NRRt = provincial government revenue realized from the sale of natural resources in period t that 
enters the operating account.
Dt-1 = government debt at beginning of year t
Dt = government debt at end of year t
Dt - Dt-1 = government deficit in year t
rt = average effective rate of interest on net debt in year t.
This equation is an accounting relationship that specifies the difference between all sources of 
government spending (Gt and rtDt-1) and all sources of government tax, transfer and resource revenue 
(Tt, TRt and NRRt) as the change in the government’s debt (i.e. the government’s deficit). In any 
given year debt may rise or fall depending on whether spending exceeds revenue or revenue exceeds 
spending.
3A bit of rearranging allows us to write;
1 1
.
t t t t t t t tD D NRR G rD T TR
GAP
      

 
The budget GAP is the amount of revenue required to avoid an imbalance between all sources of 
spending and all sources of non-resource revenue. The GAP can be filled with borrowing and/or by 
resource revenue. This is an interesting way of arranging the government budget constraint because 
the two items on the left hand side define amounts being borrowed from future generations; either 
by consuming the revenue gained from selling non-renewable resources or by borrowing against 
their future income.2 Defining the budget GAP in this way is also interesting because it identifies the 
exposure of the provincial budget to the vagaries of international commodity price movements and 
so the extent to which these governments are willing to fund programs with uncertain and oft-times 
highly volatile revenues.
3. FILLING THE GAP
In this section I present for Alberta, Saskatchewan, Newfoundland and Labrador, measures of 
the GAP and the sources of revenue – resource revenues and borrowing – available to fill it. I also 
provide a very brief history of how these measures have changed over time in each of the three 
provinces.
Alberta
Figure 1 presents data describing key budget categories for Alberta. The red line shows provincial 
government spending on goods and services (Gt) plus interest payments on previously accumulated 
debt (rtDt-1). The blue line shows provincial revenues from taxation net of transfers to individuals 
and firms (Tt) as well as the cash value of federal transfers (TRt). The difference in these amounts is 
what we call the budget GAP and is shown by the vertical distance between the red and blue lines. 
The bars identify sources of revenue available to fill the GAP; natural resource revenues (NRRt) and 
borrowing (Dt - Dt-1). All data is adjusted for inflation and is presented on a per capita basis. The 
data, then, should be understood as representing per capita values measured in constant 2014-15 
dollars.
2 
Different budget “gaps” can be defined. Thus we could also define; 
1 1 .t t t t t t t tD D NRR TR G rD T 1GAP          GAP1 defines the difference between the value of goods and 
services received (including interest income on government debt) and taxes paid by citizens of the province. Available to fill 
this version of the budget gap is borrowing, federal transfers and natural resource revenue. 
4FIGURE 1 ALBERTA
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When above the zero line, the blue bars indicate that resource revenues have been insufficient 
for filling the GAP so that the government has had to borrow. These bars, then, identify a budget 
deficit. When below the zero line, the blue bars indicate that resource revenues have been more than 
sufficient to fill the GAP and so the government has been able to pay down previously accumulated 
debt. These bars, then, identify a budget surplus.
The OPEC price shocks of the mid and late 1970s had a dramatic effect on the resource revenues 
collected by the province. As shown in Figure 1, in 1978-79 resource revenues were nearly sufficient 
to pay for all of provincial expenditure. For the first three years of our analysis (1970-71 to 1972-
73), resource revenues accounted for an average of 24 per cent of total revenues but for the rest 
of the decade this share would average 52 per cent. In the 1970s, resource revenues were more 
than sufficient to fill the GAP with the result that the government was able to report large overall 
surpluses.
From 1979-80 to 1985-86, the average annual growth rate in total expenditures (21 per cent) was 
far greater than that for non-resource revenue (14 per cent) so that the GAP widened dramatically. 
In 1985-86, the GAP was the widest it has ever been; over $5,000 per person (in 2014-15 dollars). 
Resource revenues were unable to fill that GAP and so the government had to borrow. The 
government reported deficits in 4 of 6 years from 1979-80 to 1985-86.
And then things got worse. The collapse in oil prices in 1986-87 saw resource revenues fall by 60 
per cent and with a still large GAP to finance, the government began reporting what would be a long 
string of deficits.
5The election of 1993 brought a series of large cuts to spending that dramatically reduced the size 
of the budget GAP. Between 1992-93 and 1997-98, total spending fell by over 25 per cent and the 
GAP was reduced by over 80 per cent in real per capita dollars. With the GAP now at less than 
$600 per capita in 1997-98, resource revenues, which although to this point had still not recovered 
to anywhere near 1985-86 levels, were again more than sufficient to fill the GAP so that budget 
surpluses returned. 
A string of larger amounts of resource revenue, starting with a large spike in resource revenues in 
2000-01, coincided with a significant widening of the GAP starting in that year. Despite the growing 
GAP, the larger amounts of resource revenue were more than sufficient to enable the government to 
report steadily larger surpluses. Even the recession that saw non-resource revenues fall in 2008-09, 
causing the GAP to nearly double in size relative to the previous year – produced only a small deficit 
thanks to the large amounts of resource revenue remaining.
By the time the economy started to recover in 2010-11, the GAP had widened to equal $3,400 or 
nearly six times what it was in 1997-98. Non-resource revenues recovered strongly following the 
recession closing the GAP to $2,230 in 2013-14. The government could report a barely balanced 
budget on its operating account.
Fiscal year 2014-15 was a momentous one for the government as oil prices fell by half in the 
second half of the year. In its budget released on March 26, 2015, the government indicated that 
it expects resource revenues will fall from $2,100 per capita in 2014-15 to just $680 per capita in 
2015-16.3 Recognizing the need to reduce its dependence on resource revenues, the government also 
announced a 10-year plan to shrink spending in real per capita terms by about 1.4 per cent annually. 
With non-NRR revenues expected to grow by about 0.8 per cent per year in real per capita terms, 
the GAP will close by 2.2 percentage points per year. If all this can be maintained for 10 years, by 
2024-25 the GAP will have been reduced by about one-fifth from its level in 2013-14. This modest 
shrinking of the GAP to $1,745 in real per capita dollars will return it to its value in 2004-05.4 
Saskatchewan
Figure 2 plots the same budget information for Saskatchewan as Figure 1 presented for Alberta. The 
same vertical scale is used to make for an easier comparison of the values in the two provinces.
3 
This calculation and the rest of the calculations in this paragraph, assumes an annual rate of inflation and an annual rate 
of population growth each equal to 1.7 per cent. That assumption is consistent with what is forecast in the 2015 Budget. 
Interestingly, had the GAP been kept at its 1997-98 level of $600 per capita, even this low amount of resource revenue would 
have been sufficient to result in a budget surplus.
4 Closing the GAP with resource revenues in 2024-25 will therefore require approximately $8,500 million of resource 
revenue (in 2014-15 dollars and assuming a 1.7 per cent annual growth rate in population). The 2015 Budget forecasts 
resource revenues of $12,744 million in 2024-25. Assuming an annual rate of inflation averaging 1.7 per cent per year, this 
is equivalent to $10,736 million in 2014-15 dollars. If all goes according to the Budget 2015 forecasts, resource revenues 
will therefore be more than sufficient to fill the GAP in 2024-25 and so leave the government with a budget surplus of about 
$2,000 million in 2014-15 dollars.
6FIGURE 2 SASKATCHEWAN
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It is obvious from comparing Figures 1 and 2 that, like Alberta, the government of Saskatchewan 
has relied heavily on resource revenues to fill a persistent gap between what the government spends 
and what it collects in non-resource related revenues. An important difference is that until very 
recently Alberta has typically received far more resource revenue than Saskatchewan. Prior to 2007-
08, Alberta received an average of $2,913 per capita in resource revenues compared to $1,222 in 
Saskatchewan. Since that time, however, the two provinces have collected very similar amounts of 
resource revenue when measured in real per capita terms.
Prior to the first OPEC oil price shock, resource revenues constituted about 8 per cent of total 
provincial revenues and the GAP, averaging only $175 per capita, was equal to about 5 per cent of 
total revenues. The combination of this small GAP and resource revenues averaging nearly $300 
per capita was small budget surpluses. Increases in oil prices during the 1970s simultaneously 
increased resource revenues and widened the GAP. By 1985-86, the GAP had grown to over $2,800 
per capita (26 per cent of total revenue) and resource revenues were now over $1,550 per capita. As 
these numbers suggest, the government now had to borrow nearly $1,300 per capita to fill the GAP. 
Although resource revenues had grown to be nine times what they were in the early 1970s, the 
provincial government’s dependence of those revenues – a dependence measured by the size of the 
GAP – had grown even faster. Sizeable deficits, which first appeared in 1982-83, would become the 
norm for 12 straight years and the province was rapidly accumulating a large amount of public debt.5
5 
See Ron Kneebone, “Sources of Debt Accumulation in Resource Dependent Provinces,” The School of Public Policy 
(forthcoming) for details and for an examination of the amount of this debt due to policy choices as opposed to cycle and 
commodity prices.
7The collapse in oil prices in 1986 caused, as they did in Alberta, a dramatic increase in the budget 
deficit Saskatchewan reported in fiscal year 1986-87. What followed was a decade of deficits and low 
resource revenues until 1994-95. Over this period spending restraint and, especially, faster revenue 
growth combined to shrink the GAP from $3,150 per capita in 1986-87 – equal to a remarkable 60 
per cent of revenue to 11 per cent of total revenue ($890 per capita) in 1994-95. By 1994-95, the GAP 
was small enough that resource revenues were sufficient to fill it and the government was able to 
report, for the first time since 1981-82, a budget surplus.
From 1994-95 to 2006-07, the budget GAP remained relatively small, averaging $1,280 per capita 
or 15 per cent of total revenue. Resource revenues closely matched the size of the GAP and the 
government was able to report budget surpluses in all but two of those years.
Fiscal years 2007-08 and 2008-09 were notable for the effect on provincial finances of a dramatic 
increase in potash prices. Resource revenues made up 27 per cent and 37 per cent of total revenues 
in those two years (up from 20 per cent in 2006-07) and the government was able to report large 
surpluses despite it allowing a significant widening of the budget GAP from $1,540 per capita 
in 2006-07 to $2,865 per capita in 2008-09. Unfortunately, after 2008-09 potash prices fell and 
Saskatchewan also had to suffer the consequences of the world-wide economic slowdown. Since 
2009-10 spending restraint has more or less offset losses on non-resource revenue so that the 
GAP has remained roughly constant. While since 2009-10 the province has been able to maintain 
balanced budgets, it has been able to do so only by devoting 100 per cent of resource revenue to 
filling the budget GAP. 
Interestingly, Saskatchewan’s budget GAP in 2013-14, at $2,500 per capita and 24 per cent of 
revenue, was significantly larger than Alberta’s $2,200 per capita and 19 per cent of revenue. Despite 
that, the most recent budget in Saskatchewan6 reports a small surplus and unlike the Government of 
Alberta for which this was a focus, reports little concern over its reliance on resource revenues.
The relative lack of anxiety over the size of its GAP, is likely due to the fact Saskatchewan’s reliance 
on oil prices to generate resource revenues is not as great as Alberta’s. The same fall in world oil 
prices that occurred in 2014 and that is expected to cost Alberta 67 per cent of its resource revenues 
in 2015-16 is forecast, by the Government of Saskatchewan, to cause its resource revenues to 
fall by only 7 per cent.7 The fall in oil prices, then, is not exerting the same sense of urgency on 
Saskatchewan as it is Alberta, to lessen the province’s reliance on resource revenues.
Newfoundland and Labrador
Figure 3 presents data describing the finances of the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, 
since 1970-71. The vertical scale differs from Figures 1 and 2 reflecting the fact per capita spending 
is significantly larger than in Alberta and Saskatchewan.8
Data is presented from 1970-71 even though resource revenues became significant in Newfoundland 
and Labrador only by the mid 2000s. This is done so that some appreciation can be had for the effect 
of resource revenues have had on public finances in general and on federal transfer payments in 
6 Saskatchewan Provincial Budget 15-16, released March 31, 2015.
7 
See Saskatchewan Provincial Budget 15-16. Non-renewable resource revenue is forecast to fall from $2,634 million in 2014-
15 to $2,453 in 2015-16. This reflects a loss of $402 million due to the fall in the price of oil but a gain of $233 million in 
potash revenue and increases in other non-renewable resources, primarily uranium.
8 
At least in part this reflects economies of scale in the provision of public services.
8particular. Federal transfer payments, which are included in the measure of non-resource revenues 
shown by the solid blue line, are shown by the dashed line. From 1970-71 to 2004-05 when 
noticeable amounts on resource revenues began to enter the budget, federal transfers averaged 46 per 
cent of total revenues. As resource revenues have grown in importance, federal transfers have fallen 
both absolutely and as a fraction of total revenue.9 In 2013-14, federal transfers constituted only 14 
per cent of total revenue, down from 45 per cent at the beginning of the century.
FIGURE 3 NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR
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Federal Transfers
During the 1970s the budget GAP was very large – averaging $2,500 per capita and 63 per cent of 
total revenues. With the government receiving very little in the way of resource revenues, the result 
was that the government realized very large deficits and accumulated a significant amount of debt. 
The fiscal picture improved in the 1980s when the GAP closed to average $784 per capita or 11 
per cent of revenues. The declaration by the Minister of Finance of a “financial crisis” in 1990-91 
and the federal moratorium to close the Atlantic cod fishery in 1992 preceded a severe program of 
fiscal austerity that constrained spending, particularly in 1995-96 and 1996-97.10 What resulted were 
the first budgetary surpluses since 1949-50. Unfortunately, the rest of the 1990s and the early part 
of the 2000s were marked by slow revenue growth resulting from the closing of the fishery and a 
significant out-migration. The budgetary GAP grew from zero in 1997-98 to $2,600 per capita or 26 
per cent of total revenue in 2003-04. 
9 This is a consequence of the various provisions of the Atlantic Accord by which the province stopped receiving equalization 
payments effective 2008-09 and other transition payments effective 2012-13.
10 
For a detailed description of the province’s finances during this period, see Dave Norris, “The Fiscal Position of 
Newfoundland and Labrador,” “Royal Commission on Renewing and Strengthening Our Place in Canada,” March 2003.
9Prior to 2003-04, the government had virtually no access to resource revenues to help finance the 
budget GAP. Revenue collected from the application of a minerals tax was never been a significant 
contributor to the budget. This began to change with the development of off-shore oil fields and 
the flow of oil royalties that started to have a significant impact on the budget by the mid-2000s. 
The growth of the oil industry not only increased income and corporate tax revenues and shrank 
the budgetary GAP, but it also provided resource revenues sufficient to close the GAP. By 2007-08, 
resource revenues had grown so large they could not only fill the GAP but would also allow the 
province to report large budget surpluses in 2007-08 and 2008-09.
Fiscal year 2009-10 saw the province suffer a significant loss of revenue as a result of a large cut 
to federal transfers; a consequence of a deal with the federal government that granted the province 
access to 100 per cent of oil royalties but also saw large cuts to equalization payments. The fiscal 
GAP yawned wide open after 2008-09; from less than $700 per capita and 4 per cent of revenue 
to nearly $5,900 per capita and 43 per cent of revenue by 2013-14. Even large amounts of resource 
revenues averaging $4,115 per capita and 30 per cent of revenue in 2012-13 and 2013-14 could not fill 
the GAP. With the result, the province returned to deficit in those years.
Like Alberta, Newfoundland and Labrador entered the 2014-15 fiscal year highly exposed to any fall 
in oil prices. In its Fall Update,11 the government indicated that resource revenue would be lower 
by $792 million or 35 per cent lower relative to the previous year. As the impact of lower oil prices 
is felt for a full fiscal year, the expectation for 2015-16 is that resource revenues will be lower still. 
Assuming the GAP in 2015-16 is the same as in 2013-14 ($5,900 per person) and assuming resource 
revenues are lower by $1,000 million relative to 2013-14 (leaving per capita resource revenues at 
about $2,400), we should expect a deficit of about $3,300 per person or about $1,800 million in 
total.12 A deficit of $3,300 per person would make this the largest deficit in real per capita terms 
since at least 1970-71.
4. DISCUSSION
Significant amounts of resource revenues provide governments with the opportunity to minimize tax 
rates and provide high-quality public services without the need to impose high tax rates on citizens 
and firms. This advantage, however, comes at a price: These revenues are often volatile. Given that 
they enter government coffers without the need to impose taxes on voters, these revenues also offer 
the temptation for governments to gain favour with voters with cuts to tax rates and/or increases in 
services beyond what might otherwise be affordable.
This note has presented a brief review of the fiscal histories of two provinces with long histories of 
dealing with resource revenues and one province that has only begun to deal with this issue. What 
can the experiences of the governments of Alberta and Saskatchewan tell us that might be helpful 
for advising the government of Newfoundland and Labrador?
Below are the results of simple pooled regression intended to identify the sensitivity of the current 
size of the GAP to changes in natural resource revenues (NRR) observed in the previous year. A 
11 Fall Update 2014-15 (http://www.fin.gov.nl.ca/fin/publications/fallupdate_2014_15.pdf).
12 
In its Pre-Budget Consultation document (http://www.fin.gov.nl.ca/fin/budget/prebudget/index.html) the government 
indicates a revenue shortfall (a deficit) of over $1,000 million for the 2015-16 fiscal year. For the deficit to come in near that 
amount, one must assume either a much smaller loss of resource revenue than predicted in the Fall Update or a vigorous 
response to cut spending and raising tax revenues during the fiscal year.
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positive relationship indicates that an increase in resource revenues encourages policy-makers 
to allow their budget GAP to grow either by allowing for spending increases with no additional 
tax revenue or by introducing tax cuts without a corresponding reduction in spending.13 The 
data is measured in real per capita dollars and uses data on the GAP and NRR for Alberta and 
Saskatchewan for the period 1971-72 to 2013-14.
GAP = 1148 + 0.407*NRR(-1) R2 = 0.253 
 (5.91) (5.34) N = 86
The regression confirms that Alberta and Saskatchewan typically maintain large budgetary GAP 
measures (averaging $1,148 per capita) and the size of that GAP is sensitive to the recent receipt 
of resource revenues. In particular, every $1.00 increase in resource revenues causes the GAP to 
increase by $0.41 in the year following.
The idea that revenue obtained by ways other than taxing voters might encourage governments to 
budget differently than otherwise is well-known in the literature. Political economists have coined 
the term fiscal illusion to describe the tendency for taxpayers to systematically underestimate the 
true cost of publicly-provided goods and services. The illusion arises because of the difficulty 
taxpayers have in understanding how much they pay in taxes toward specific programs. Generally 
speaking, a fiscal illusion arises when governments rely on indirect ways of funding expenditures. 
Provincial governments extract revenue from taxpayers directly via income taxes, less directly via 
sales taxes, less directly again via the revenue they receive from the federal government in the form 
of intergovernmental transfers and even less directly still by the revenue they gain from taxing the 
rents earned on the development of natural resources.14 The result of the simple regression reported 
above is consistent with the fiscal illusion hypothesis. As the availability of resource revenues 
grows, governments find it easier to increase spending and lower taxes; that is, it becomes easier for 
governments to increase the size of the budget GAP. 
In the next regression I identify the sensitivity of the GAP to resource revenues in Newfoundland 
and Labrador.15
GAP = 1236 + 0.596*NRR(-1) R2 = 0.463 
 (6.42) (5.95) N = 43
The result of this regression suggests that although the government of Newfoundland and Labrador 
is new to this game of dealing with large amounts of resource revenue, it seems to be following the 
same playbook as the governments of Alberta and Saskatchewan, namely, allow the budget GAP to 
grow when resource revenues have increased in the year previous.
Figure 4 presents for the three provinces, the size of resource revenues measured in real per capita 
terms since 1970-71. The remarkable similarity in the dramatic oil-induced rise in resource revenues 
observed recently in Newfoundland and Labrador to what Alberta experienced in the early 1970s 
13 
t-statistics appear in parenthesis below the estimated coefficients.
14 
Economists also note that the incidence of these revenues – who actually pays the tax as opposed to who is legislated to pay 
it – is typically opaque and so further complicates the voter’s efforts to assess his or her true share of program costs.
15 
An alternative specification recognizes that in Newfoundland and Labrador provisions of the Atlantic Accord specified that 
the increase in NRR would result in a fall in federal transfers. Regressing the GAP against the increase in resource revenues 
net of federal transfers results in a very similar measure of the sensitivity of the GAP to revenue gained from not taxing 
citizens of the province;  
GAP = 3391 + 0.650*(NRR-TRANSFERS)(-1) R2 = 0.626 
 (13.75) (8.29)
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should give pause to budget-makers in Newfoundland and Labrador. Like Alberta in that earlier 
era, Newfoundland and Labrador has today allowed this gusher of revenue to widen the gap 
between what it spends and what it collects by way of non-resource revenue. Like Alberta then, the 
government of Newfoundland and Labrador has responded to this revenue in a way that exposes 
itself, and its taxpayers, to the potential for draconian spending cuts and/or sudden increases in 
tax rates when world oil prices fall. It is a high-risk budgeting strategy that has been the bane of 
Albertans for decades.
FIGURE 4 REAL PER CAPITA RESOURCE REVENUES
 
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
19
70
-7
1
19
71
-7
2
19
72
-7
3
19
73
-7
4
19
74
-7
5
19
75
-7
6
19
76
-7
7
19
77
-7
8
19
78
-7
9
19
79
-8
0
19
80
-8
1
19
81
-8
2
19
82
-8
3
19
83
-8
4
19
84
-8
5
19
85
-8
6
19
86
-8
7
19
87
-8
8
19
88
-8
9
19
89
-9
0
19
90
-9
1
19
91
-9
2
19
92
-9
3
19
93
-9
4
19
94
-9
5
19
95
-9
6
19
96
-9
7
19
97
-9
8
19
98
-9
9
19
99
-0
0
20
00
-0
1
20
01
-0
2
20
02
-0
3
20
03
-0
4
20
04
-0
5
20
05
-0
6
20
06
-0
7
20
07
-0
8
20
08
-0
9
20
09
-1
0
20
10
-1
1
20
11
-1
2
20
12
-1
3
20
13
-1
4
R
e
so
u
rc
e 
R
e
ve
n
u
es
 p
er
 c
ap
it
a 
(2
0
1
4
-1
5 
d
o
lla
rs
)
Saskatchewan
Alberta
Newfoundland & Labrador
5. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this note was to summarize how provincial governments fortunate enough to have 
access to significant amounts of resource revenue deal with the budgetary implications of that data. 
The governments of Alberta and Saskatchewan have long histories of dealing with large amounts of 
resource revenue. It is fair to say that they have not always dealt with these revenues very effectively. 
Both provinces have at times allowed themselves to become very heavily dependent on volatile 
and unpredictable resource revenues to fund the provision of health care, education, social services 
and other important programs. Periodic efforts to reduce this dependence – to close what has been 
identified here as the budget GAP, have resulted in sometimes draconian spending cuts the effect of 
12
which have been felt for many years into the future. Except for very short periods of time in the late 
1970s (Alberta) and mid 1980s (Saskatchewan), neither province has been successful at saving their 
non-renewable resource revenues for the benefit of future generations.16
The government of Newfoundland and Labrador has unfortunately followed in the footsteps of 
the governments of Alberta and Saskatchewan by allowing itself to become heavily dependent on 
resource revenues. Indeed, as shown in the table below, by the end of 2013-14, the last year for which 
we have reliable data, the government of Newfoundland and Labrador was the most dependent on 
resource revenues and the most exposed should those revenues fall. 
Fiscal GAP Resource Revenue
(as percentage of total provincial revenue)
Alberta 19% 21%
Saskatchewan 24% 22%
Newfoundland & Labrador 43% 32%
The governments of Alberta and Saskatchewan have recently tabled budgets for the 2015-16 fiscal 
year. The Government of Alberta introduced a budget with significant tax increases and a plan for 
gradual cuts to spending; both explicitly intended to reduce the reliance on resource revenues. In 
its budget for 2015-16, the Government of Saskatchewan has been much more sanguine about its 
reliance on resource revenues likely because potash prices have proved to be more stable than the 
prices for fossil fuels. The Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, easily the most dependent 
on resource revenues and the most exposed to volatility in oil prices, will table its 2015-16 budget at 
the end of April 2015. In that budget, hard choices will need to be made if the government is to avoid 
the discouraging budgetary history of Saskatchewan and particularly, Alberta in allowing volatility 
of resource revenues to cause volatility in funding for health, education and social services.
16 
Alberta established the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund in 1976 but, as I have described elsewhere (“From Famine 
to Feast: The Evolution of Budgeting Rules in Alberta,” Canadian Tax Journal, Volume 54, No. 3, 2006) the provincial 
government’s commitment to depositing resource revenues into the AHSTF has rarely survived demands for revenue 
resulting from economic downturns. The government of Saskatchewan established the Saskatchewan Heritage Fund in 
1978 to receive and invest natural resource revenues but that was divested and eliminated in 1992. In its 2014 budget, the 
government indicated its intention to use resource revenues to fund the creation of a Saskatchewan Futures Fund. In the 
recent 2015 budget, that plan was once again put on hold. The government of Newfoundland and Labrador, a relatively 
recent recipient of significant amounts of resource revenue, has not to my knowledge had any public discussions of using 
resource revenues for other than current consumption. 
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APPENDIX
The following three tables present the provincial budget data used in this study. These data comes 
from the Public Accounts of the three provinces and are reported in dollars per capita measured in 
2014-15 dollars. The data represent each provincial government’s operating account. The operating 
account is intended to measure the cost of on-going programs and services and the amount of 
revenue collected for the purpose of financing those costs. It excludes spending related to public 
infrastructure investments. 
There are two distinct advantages over other sources of using data drawn from provincial public 
accounts. The first is that one is able to construct a dataset that spans any period described by those 
accounts. The second is that public accounts make available information on the amount of revenue 
governments collect from taxes and royalties applied to natural resources. Statistics Canada’s 
Financial Management System reports data only for the period 1988-98 to 2008-09 and does not 
report resource revenue separate from what it defines as “investment income.”17 Statistics Canada 
Provincial Economic Accounts suffer from similar problems; they do not report resource revenues 
as a separate budget category and is limited to providing data for the period 1981-2009. To describe 
the influence on provincial finances of the OPEC oil price shocks of the 1970s and the more recent 
shocks to oil and potash prices since 2009, one needs to rely on public accounts data. 
It is worth noting that that the Fiscal Reference Tables (FRT) published by the federal Department 
of Finance also present data from provincial public accounts. The FRT, however, do not report 
natural resource revenues and those accounts report data only back to fiscal year 1980-81. Where 
the FRT and the data used here overlap, they are in very close agreement. A notable difference is for 
Alberta, where in the data used here – resource revenues transferred to the Alberta Heritage Savings 
and Trust Fund have been subtracted from resource revenue and from total revenue.18 This is done 
so that the data represents, as noted above, only the government’s operating account. It is also 
important to note that while in the data used here the deficit is measured as the difference between 
total expenditures and total revenue that is not true in the FRT. The FRT includes in its calculations 
of the deficit “other” expenditures not always associated with the operating account.
Data on total provincial population data is from CANSIM tables 510001 (1971-2014) and 510024 
(1971). These data are reported by calendar year (CY). To match budget data, which is reported on 
by fiscal year (FY, April 1st to March 31st), a fiscal year version of provincial population is calculated 
using the formula FYt-1,t = 0.25*CYt + 0.75*CYt-1. Nominal values of budget categories are deflated 
using the all-items Consumer Price Index for major cities. The CPI for St. John’s is used to represent 
the CPI for Newfoundland and Labrador while the simple average of the CPIs for Saskatoon 
and Regina and for Calgary and Edmonton are used to represent Saskatchewan and Alberta, 
respectively. These CPI data are from CANSIM Table 3260020 and is reported monthly. Averages of 
the monthly CPI data are calculated over the period defining a fiscal year. 
17 
Statistics Canada is moving to a new approach to measuring government financial statistics and has indicated that it intends 
to soon begin publishing data based on its new accounting framework starting with fiscal year 2008-09. I am not aware of 
any statement suggesting a revision to historical data will accompany the adoption of the new accounting framework.
18 These transfers occurred in 1976-77 to 1986-87 and from 2005-06 to 2007-08, inclusive.
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Alberta
(2014-15 dollars per capita)
Fiscal  
Year
Program  
Expenditure
Debt  
Charges
Natural  
Resource  
Revenue
Non-NRR Revenue
GAP Deficit
Total Federal Transfers
1970-71 4,427 35 914 3,128 787 1,334 420
1971-72 4,654 62 1,018 3,182 900 1,534 517
1972-73 4,704 80 1,157 3,413 807 1,371 214
1973-74 4,710 75 2,032 3,528 1,092 1,257 -775
1974-75 5,752 86 4,273 3,963 621 1,875 -2,398
1975-76 6,613 79 4,247 3,938 1,064 2,754 -1,493
1976-77 6,390 54 4,752 3,729 1,237 2,716 -2,036
1977-78 6,580 47 5,981 3,971 998 2,656 -3,325
1978-79 6,279 46 6,196 3,914 1,050 2,410 -3,785
1979-80 6,879 31 4,821 5,729 912 1,180 -3,641
1980-81 9,831 29 4,211 5,595 970 4,265 54
1981-82 9,648 102 3,697 6,832 1,278 2,917 -780
1982-83 11,540 54 2,713 6,745 1,151 4,849 2,136
1983-84 10,937 160 3,809 6,733 1,228 4,364 555
1984-85 10,815 209 4,114 7,375 1,544 3,648 -466
1985-86 12,229 160 3,744 7,371 1,576 5,019 1,275
1986-87 11,288 251 1,416 6,531 1,428 5,009 3,593
1987-88 10,249 462 2,119 7,489 1,543 3,221 1,102
1988-89 10,251 623 1,630 7,675 1,669 3,200 1,569
1989-90 10,118 815 1,638 7,748 1,420 3,184 1,547
1990-91 9,968 867 1,818 7,778 1,600 3,058 1,239
1991-92 9,588 837 1,288 7,462 1,369 2,963 1,675
1992-93 10,011 878 1,351 7,481 1,521 3,408 2,057
1993-94 9,142 1,000 1,703 7,610 1,263 2,532 829
1994-95 7,909 1,024 1,982 7,502 1,132 1,432 -550
1995-96 7,193 955 1,580 7,220 991 927 -653
1996-97 6,926 797 2,200 6,881 737 842 -1,357
1997-98 7,254 696 1,990 7,361 623 589 -1,400
1998-99 7,274 699 1,201 7,328 677 646 -555
1999-00 7,929 463 2,254 7,491 795 901 -1,353
2000-01 8,286 452 4,880 6,887 836 1,851 -3,029
2001-02 8,878 342 2,754 6,944 1,001 2,276 -478
2002-03 8,308 197 2,954 6,435 859 2,070 -884
2003-04 8,511 107 3,041 7,216 1,159 1,403 -1,639
2004-05 9,121 115 3,726 7,489 1,231 1,747 -1,979
2005-06 9,713 90 4,575 7,698 1,232 2,105 -2,470
2006-07 9,922 73 3,729 8,724 1,042 1,270 -2,459
2007-08 10,534 68 3,190 8,568 962 2,034 -1,156
2008-09 10,932 62 3,573 7,166 1,255 3,829 255
2009-10 10,678 107 1,989 8,492 1,452 2,293 303
2010-11 10,892 135 2,417 7,632 1,441 3,396 978
2011-12 10,700 137 3,197 7,668 1,313 3,203 6
2012-13 10,912 136 2,066 8,227 1,276 2,821 755
2013-14 11,104 149 2,420 9,024 1,700 2,229 -191
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Saskatchewan
(2014-15 dollars per capita)
Fiscal  
Year
Program  
Expenditure
Debt  
Charges
Natural  
Resource  
Revenue
Non-NRR Revenue
GAP Deficit
Total Federal Transfers
1970-71 2,653 13 259 2,417 647 250 -9
1971-72 2,974 11 261 2,788 1,021 197 -64
1972-73 3,188 11 279 3,113 1,053 87 -192
1973-74 4,619 12 372 4,461 2,015 170 -203
1974-75 5,135 12 596 4,675 1,834 472 -124
1975-76 5,576 10 796 4,900 1,605 686 -110
1976-77 5,919 15 748 5,084 1,410 850 102
1977-78 6,008 29 1,479 4,679 1,266 1,358 -121
1978-79 6,201 61 1,844 4,664 1,355 1,599 -245
1979-80 6,227 81 1,900 4,756 1,343 1,552 -347
1980-81 5,935 64 2,307 3,716 1,249 2,282 -24
1981-82 6,164 113 1,978 4,320 1,396 1,957 -21
1982-83 6,639 99 1,853 4,175 996 2,564 711
1983-84 6,490 125 1,681 4,096 1,237 2,518 837
1984-85 6,617 217 1,831 4,078 1,265 2,756 925
1985-86 6,849 385 1,557 4,411 1,320 2,823 1,266
1986-87 7,392 377 597 4,622 1,564 3,147 2,551
1987-88 6,503 522 848 5,019 1,708 2,005 1,157
1988-89 6,554 574 637 5,833 1,926 1,295 657
1989-90 6,874 905 609 6,382 2,130 1,397 788
1990-91 7,553 793 696 6,989 2,488 1,356 661
1991-92 7,073 809 524 6,000 2,030 1,881 1,357
1992-93 6,695 1,172 627 6,303 2,065 1,565 938
1993-94 6,264 1,341 695 6,493 1,917 1,112 417
1994-95 6,346 1,327 1,080 6,785 1,952 887 -193
1995-96 6,272 1,249 990 6,558 1,434 963 -27
1996-97 6,185 1,142 1,305 6,606 1,093 720 -585
1997-98 6,232 1,075 1,114 6,244 788 1,064 -50
1998-99 6,769 1,044 872 6,981 1,347 832 -40
1999-00 7,015 962 1,287 6,806 1,670 1,171 -116
2000-01 7,112 898 1,749 7,388 1,180 622 -1,127
2001-02 7,578 817 1,092 6,933 1,639 1,462 369
2002-03 7,412 786 1,600 6,706 1,030 1,493 -107
2003-04 7,815 764 1,446 6,867 1,309 1,712 266
2004-05 7,966 715 1,821 7,805 2,059 876 -945
2005-06 8,668 662 2,091 7,894 1,538 1,436 -655
2006-07 9,163 640 2,014 8,262 1,651 1,541 -473
2007-08 9,137 622 3,002 8,215 1,822 1,543 -1,459
2008-09 10,661 564 5,000 8,361 1,853 2,865 -2,135
2009-10 10,152 507 2,016 8,819 1,693 1,839 -177
2010-11 10,777 434 2,585 8,724 1,636 2,487 -97
2011-12 10,456 404 2,769 8,144 1,694 2,716 -54
2012-13 10,460 371 2,388 8,457 1,587 2,373 -15
2013-14 10,400 301 2,314 8,188 1,484 2,513 199
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Newfoundland and Labrador
(2014-15 dollars per capita)
Fiscal  
Year
Program  
Expenditure
Debt  
Charges
Natural  
Resource  
Revenue
Non-NRR Revenue
GAP Deficit
Total Federal Transfers
1970-71 4,621 423 36 2,806 2,032 2,238 2,202
1971-72 5,569 456 34 3,189 2,334 2,836 2,801
1972-73 5,749 442 32 3,222 1,337 2,969 2,938
1973-74 5,551 509 28 3,648 1,574 2,413 2,385
1974-75 5,924 546 17 3,905 1,638 2,565 2,548
1975-76 6,322 561 22 4,102 1,505 2,781 2,759
1976-77 6,981 682 48 4,417 1,609 3,245 3,197
1977-78 6,474 781 69 5,164 2,355 2,091 2,022
1978-79 6,960 839 81 5,427 2,609 2,372 2,291
1979-80 6,520 908 73 6,091 2,996 1,337 1,264
1980-81 5,961 934 90 6,403 3,209 492 402
1981-82 5,999 958 107 6,244 3,200 712 606
1982-83 6,133 1,007 84 6,341 3,201 799 715
1983-84 6,496 1,063 73 6,342 3,206 1,217 1,143
1984-85 6,211 1,184 65 6,482 3,317 913 849
1985-86 6,426 1,319 62 6,864 3,442 882 820
1986-87 6,586 1,382 86 7,150 3,667 818 732
1987-88 7,050 1,409 90 7,760 3,756 699 609
1988-89 7,336 1,367 62 7,962 3,959 741 679
1989-90 7,633 1,324 64 8,388 4,112 569 504
1990-91 7,753 1,345 59 8,085 3,836 1,012 954
1991-92 7,546 1,296 52 8,069 3,729 773 721
1992-93 7,656 1,259 38 8,203 3,872 712 674
1993-94 7,290 1,273 38 8,002 3,722 560 522
1994-95 7,613 1,352 45 8,560 4,158 405 360
1995-96 6,514 1,384 66 8,784 3,682 -887 -952
1996-97 6,397 1,374 55 8,589 3,787 -817 -872
1997-98 7,935 2,192 54 10,082 5,117 45 -9
1998-99 8,055 2,592 66 9,697 4,718 951 885
1999-00 8,359 2,247 100 9,454 4,124 1,152 1,052
2000-01 8,614 2,389 152 9,644 4,413 1,359 1,207
2001-02 8,988 2,370 131 9,682 4,168 1,676 1,545
2002-03 9,175 2,386 236 9,388 3,873 2,173 1,937
2003-04 9,967 2,357 346 9,724 3,704 2,600 2,254
2004-05 9,492 2,214 639 9,513 3,563 2,193 1,554
2005-06 10,206 2,192 1,284 11,163 4,352 1,235 -49
2006-07 10,526 1,782 1,249 10,997 3,996 1,311 62
2007-08 11,224 1,697 4,586 11,094 4,039 1,826 -2,760
2008-09 12,100 1,627 5,366 13,049 5,589 678 -4,688
2009-10 13,781 1,906 4,722 10,487 3,308 5,200 478
2010-11 13,891 1,735 5,446 10,985 3,655 4,641 -805
2011-12 14,075 1,576 6,215 10,846 3,184 4,806 -1,409
2012-13 13,536 1,525 3,842 10,367 1,940 4,694 852
2013-14 13,487 1,634 4,389 9,259 1,959 5,862 1,473
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THE NORTH WEST STURGEON UPGRADER: GOOD MONEY AFTER BAD?
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/north-west-sturgeon-upgrader-good-money-after-bad
Ted Morton | April 2015
ESTIMATING DISCOUNT RATES
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/estimating-discount-rates
Laurence Booth | April 2015
WHAT CANADA COULD LEARN FROM U.S. DEFENCE PROCUREMENT: ISSUES, BEST PRACTICES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/what-canada-could-learn-us-defence-procurement-issues-best-practices-and-recommendations
Anessa Kimball | April 2015
WHY DELAY THE INEVITABLE: WHY THE AIIB MATTERS TO CANADA'S FUTURE
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/why-delay-inevitable-why-aiib-matters-canadas-future
Eugene Beaulieu and Wendy Dobson | April 2015
IMPROVING THE ACQUISITION PROCESS IN CANADA
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/improving-acquisition-process-canada
Craig Stone | April 2015
A PRIMER ON RECENT CANADIAN DEFENCE BUDGETING TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/primer-recent-canadian-defence-budgeting-trends-and-implications
Dave Perry | April 2015
PEERING INTO ALBERTA’S DARKENING FUTURE: HOW OIL PRICES IMPACT ALBERTA’S ROYALTY REVENUES
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/peering-alberta%E2%80%99s-darkening-future-how-oil-prices-impact-alberta%E2%80%99s- 
royalty-revenues
Sarah Dobson | March 2015
THE SIREN SONG OF ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION: ALBERTA'S LEGACY OF LOSS
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/siren-song-economic-diversification-albertas-legacy-loss
Meredith McDonald and Ted Morton | March 2015
CAUGHT IN THE MIDDLE: SOME IN CANADA'S MIDDLE CLASS ARE DOING WELL; OTHERS HAVE GOOD REASON TO WORRY
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/caught-middle-some-canadas-middle-class-are-doing-well-others-have-good-reason-worry
Philip Cross and Munir Sheikh | March 2015
WHO ARE THE HOMELESS? NUMBERS, TRENDS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THOSE WITHOUT HOMES IN CALGARY
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/who-are-homeless-numbers-trends-and-characteristics-those-without-homes-calgary
Meaghan Bell, Nicole Jackson, Ali Jadidzadeh and Ron Kneebone | March 2015
THE EXEMPT MARKET IN CANADA: EMPIRICS, OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/exempt-market-canada-empirics-observations-and-recommendations
Vijay Jog | March 2015
